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Abstract: The article analyzes the relation between the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Modernization of the State programs and the state capacity of Brazil and Argentina during the 
Neoliberal Era in Latin America (1990-2002). The development studies indicate that state 
capacity is a precondition for any successful development strategy. Thus, a greater state 
capacity could be expected from those countries who participated in these programs, but the 
data obtained does not permit this conclusion. 
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Resumo: O artigo analisa a relação entre os Programas de Modernização do Estado do Banco 
Interamericano de Desenvolvimento e a capacidade estatal do Brasil e da Argentina durante a 
Era Neoliberal na América Latina (1990-2002). Os estudos sobre desenvolvimento indicam 
que a capacidade do Estado é uma condição prévia para qualquer estratégia de 
desenvolvimento bem-sucedida. Assim, uma maior capacidade Estatal poderia ser esperada 
dos países que participaram desses programas, mas os dados obtidos não permitem essa 
conclusão. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the studies about State and development for the last three decades, especially in the 
Institutionalist Perspective, state capacity has been increasingly considered as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for development. Development banks target “development” as a goal, 
but this concept does not have only one meaning and it is not static or accepted by everyone. 
Thus, both state capacity and development banks are in the same realm – the development 
process. This article focuses on the relation between multilateral development banks and the 
enhancement of state capacity. It is assumed that the effectiveness of development strategies 
cannot be separated from the state capacity of countries (LANGE & RUESCHMEYER, 
2005). 
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 In empirical terms, the selected cases were the relations between the IDB – the Inter-
American Development Bank - and Brazil and between the IDB and Argentina. This bank is 
the oldest and the largest multilateral development bank of the world and these two countries 
are its two most important borrowers. The analyzed period is from 1990 to 2002, when the 
neoliberal ideas started to attract many adepts in Latin America and when the IDB found a 
favorable environment to propose the restructuring of the State through a new category of 
programs: Reform/Modernization of the State. Theoretically, this is the category with the 
greatest potential to enhance state capacity. 
 The research design was comparative, focusing on the IDB-Brazil and the IDB-
Argentina relations and their impact on the state capacity of those countries. The 
operationalization of the concept of state capacity was inspired in the parameters described by 
Hendrix (2010): the tax collection capacity and the quality of the bureaucratic administrative 
staff. The information sources were Brazil’s and Argentina’s Loan Proposals and Project 
Completion Reports of the IDB’s Modernization of State programs, available on the IDB’s 
website. 
 The article is organized in three sections and the conclusions. The first addresses the 
theoretical context of the concept of state capacity. The second presents the IDB’s 
summarized history and description. The third analyzes the impact of the Modernization of 
State programs on Brazil’s and Argentina’s state capacity. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONALISMS AND STATE CAPACITY 
 The guiding concept of this research – state capacity – started to have its heuristic 
potential explored as the discussion about institutions came back in late eighties and in the 
early nineties. According to Acuña (2013), the concept of institution followed a winding path 
in Social Sciences so that the association between institutions, enforced State and 
development only became consolidated as Institutionalism started to be discussed again, 
especially New Institutionalism. For one of those new institutionalists: 
“Institutions are the foundation of social life. They consist of formal and 
informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of 
meaning that define the context within which individuals, corporations, labor 
unions, nation-states, and other organizations operate and interact with each 
other. Institutions are settlements born from struggle and bargaining. They 
reflect the resources and power of those who made them and, in turn, affect 
the distribution of resources of power in society. Once created, institutions 
are powerful external forces that help determine how people make sense of 
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their world and act in it. They channel and regulate conflict and thus ensure 
stability in society.” (CAMPBELL, 2004, p. 01)   
 
 In other words, as organizers of social life, institutions are present in every aspect of 
human action: cultural, political, and economic or in their intersection. However, the 
explanation about the nature of institutions and its implications varies. Schmidt (2008) 
distinguishes four types of Institutionalisms: rational-choice, historical, sociological, and 
discursive. The first one emphasizes the potential of institutions to reduce transaction costs 
and uncertainties. The second one focuses on the path dependence in the process of building 
institutions. The third one embraces the idea that institutions are embedded in cultural norms. 
The fourth one considers all the aspects mentioned above, but it is especially concerned with 
the dynamic character of the production of ideas and discourses around the institutions in their 
different levels of generality. In this last type, it is assumed that institutions are maintained by 
the production and reproduction of ideas so that discursive analyses can be a key tool to 
investigate them. 
 One of the institutionalist contributions to the Political Economy is the critique of the 
institutional monoculture, that is, the naturalization of the idea that some institutions are 
superior and should be adopted by all the countries. Another contribution is the skepticism 
about an inevitable opposition between State and market as antagonistic forces, and the 
diagnosis of a bad economic performance due to excessive state intervention. For many new 
institutionalists, the real point is how different institutional settlements can contribute to the 
reproduction of capital. In other words, some of them had serious doubts about the neoliberal 
ideas, which were rising in the 1990’s. 
 The discussion about state capacity became notorious when the theories which tried to 
explain politics and government action shifted from the society-centered perspectives (e. g. 
Pluralism and Structural Functionalism) to those interested in the State itself. The former 
presented the State as an arena where interests and preferences from different groups of 
society were disputed, while the latter tended to understand the State as a great institution or a 
set of interwoven institutions. It is important to note that in studies about development, 
previous hegemonic theories (e. g. Theory of Modernization and Theory of Dependence) were 
weakening (Kjaer & Hansen, 2002).  
 As most of the concepts in Social Sciences, state capacity does not have a unanimous 
accepted definition. Among recent Brazilian institutionalist studies, Gomide & Pires (2014: 
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19-20) present state capacity as embedded in the institutional set – “set of rules, mechanisms 
and processes which define the particular form that actors and interests are coordinated in the 
implementation of specific policies”. Amongst other contemporary perspectives on the 
subject, one of the most famous definition is credited to Skocpol, who assumes the weberian 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory”, but emphasizes the 
autonomy of the State and its capacity to set and persecute goals. 
“States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and 
people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the 
demands or interests of social groups, classes or society. This is what is 
usually meant by “state autonomy”. Unless such independent goal 
formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors. 
Pursuing matters further, one may then explore the ‘capacities’ of states to 
implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of 
powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic 
circumstances.” (Skocpol, 1985, p. 09) 
 
 In recent research, Saylor (2013) tries to identify the common features marked by the 
most famous conceptualizations of state capacity: control over territory; major coercive 
power; tax collection capacity; penetration of society via  military or institutional alliances; 
regulation of social relationships; and direction of (some) economic production. 
 
Table 1 - Conceptualization of State Capacity 
 Barnett 
(1992:41-
49) 
Grindle 
(1996: 
3-8) 
Huber 
(1995) 
Mann 
(1984) 
Migdal 
(1988: 
4-5) 
Skocpol 
(1985 
16-17) 
Slater 
(2010: 
3-4) 
Smith 
(2007: 
52-55) 
Controls 
territory 
  X X  X X  
Possesses 
preponderant 
coercive 
forces  
X X X X  X X  
Extracts 
revenue 
X X X X X X X X 
Penetrates 
society via 
alliances, 
military or 
institutions 
X X X X X X X X 
Regulates 
social 
relationships 
X X X X X  X X 
Directs 
(some) 
economic 
production 
X     X   
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Source: Saylor (2013: 15) 
 For development studies, Skocpol’s conceptualization has some advantages such as 
emphasis on elaboration and persecution of goals – especially policies and strategies – and the 
idea of a relatively autonomous State – the opposite idea of a State captured by the specific 
interests of a group or social class over the rest of society. It is interesting to note that these 
two features mentioned above are also very common in the studies of the developmental state. 
According to the author, some prerequisites of state capacity are sovereignty, stable 
administrative and military control, loyal and qualified civil servants (weberian bureaucracy) 
and sufficient material and financial resources. 
 Among the most important works about historical state-building are Charles Tilly’s 
The Formation of National States in Western Europe and Coercion, Capital and European 
States. According to the author, the need for resources for war demanded the building of a tax 
collection system such that the state became structured around it. In other words, since there 
was permanent foreign threat to the recent and fragile sovereignties, the costs of defense could 
only be paid for a functional tax collection system. Meanwhile, an efficient bureaucracy 
would also be necessary to manage these resources. 
 The political organization of the Nation-state was a non-intentional and unplanned 
consequence of the rising of this state capacity or, in other words, an “externality of the 
extractive practice” of contingent nature. Three elementary features can be observed in this 
infant polity: extractive capacity (tax collection capacity), military power, and administrative 
organization. According to Tilly, this form of political organization was born in Western 
Europe and spread worldwide later. 
 Hendrix (2010) points out that most of studies operationalize state capacity 
highlighting two features: tax collection capacity and quality of the bureaucratic 
administrative staff. The author defends that these two features are also the two main 
preconditions of state capacity so that its enhancement demands the improvement of these 
features. The data analysis, in this research, was guided by that idea. 
3. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND IDB 
 A development bank is defined by the fact that its loans, programs and fundings are 
targeted to development-oriented projects. Its conception can be traced back to the World War 
II, when the development theories were rising. According to Leys & Shaw (1996: 7), these 
theories were associated with the concerns of European powers to accelerate the economic 
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growth of their colonies because of the perspective of a soon decolonization. By that moment, 
economic growth and development were taken as synonymous and the State was considered 
to have an important role to channel foreign capital and induce growth. In this context, 
development banks could be important partners to these States. Besides, theses banks could 
help in countercyclical policies, keeping liquidity in periods of crisis, when private banks tend 
to shorten the supply of credit (FERRAZ et al, 2013). Multilateral development banks are like 
credit cooperatives where their borrowers are also owners of the bank (COUTO, 1999: 46-
47). Additionally, it must be mentioned that regional development banks are multilateral 
development banks which are defined by geographical criteria. 
 The IDB’s mandate and structure served as a model for international organizations 
alike which were later created such as the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank (BARRIA & ROPER, 2004: 620). 
Historically it has been Latin America’s largest multilateral source of funding. It aims to assist 
development projects in the region with more favorable conditions than those from the private 
market. As other banks of this nature, the IDB is a declared non-profit organization, although 
financial sustainability is essential to its survival as a financial institution. 
 Its members can be classified into two groups: the borrowers and the non-borrowers. 
Among the first group are the countries that can obtain loans and take advantage of the IDB’s 
programs. They must necessarily be from Latin America or Caribbean. The second group 
includes the countries that cannot obtain loans. They can be from the region (the United States 
or Canada) or from somewhere else (many countries from Europe, Japan, China and Israel, 
for instance). Currently, the IDB has 48 members: 26 borrowers and 22 non-borrowers. The 
Bank is organized as in an anonymous society, i.e., the members have voting rights 
proportional to their shares in the Bank. 
Table 2 - Voting Power of Selected Countries in 2009 (percentage)  
Geographic 
Localization 
Status Country Voting Power 
Regional Borrower 
(50,015%) 
Brazil 10,751% 
Argentina 10,751% 
Mexico 6,912% 
Venezuela 5,761% 
Chile 2,953% 
Colombia 2,953% 
Others 9,935% 
Non-Borrower 
(34,007%) 
United States 30,006% 
Canada 4,001% 
Not Regional Non-Borrower Japan 5,001% 
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(15,978%) France 1,896% 
Germany 1,896% 
Italia 1,896% 
Spain 1,896% 
Other 3,388% 
Source: IDB. Voting Power. Accessed in 31/10/2017 Available in:  
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35104877 
 
 
 The administrative structure of the Bank, similar to that of the World Bank, is 
composed of the Board of Governors, Board of Executive Directors and the Presidency. The 
first one is the IDB’s most important administrative office, where the governors – who 
represent the countries – vote according to their share in the Bank. It usually delegates power 
to the Board of Executive Directors, who actually manages the ordinary and daily operations, 
especially loans, guarantees, country strategies, administrative budget, interest rate, etc. The 
fourteen directors are elected or nominated by the Board of Governors for a term of three 
years. The United States and Canada have one specific director to represent each one of them 
and the other twelve directors represent the other countries (some of them represent more than 
one country). The president of the IDB, elected by the Board of Governors for a term of five 
years (s/he can be re-elected once), legally represents the institution, conducts the everyday 
business and leads the meetings of the Executive Board. The president votes only in cases of 
ties. The presidency always belongs to a Latin American and the vice presidency to an 
American (COUTO, 1999). 
 The resources of the Bank are classified as Ordinary Capital and Fund for Special 
Operations. The former is the available capital for most of the Bank’s operations; it comes 
from the compulsory quota paid for each one of the members, resources from the capital 
market and from the payment of conceived loans. The latter targets the poorest countries in 
the region and its resources come from the donations of the IDB’s members. 
 Barria & Roper (2004) explain that the context and the conditions at the foundation of 
a development bank influence its membership, its mandate, its structure and the lending 
policy. In the case of the IDB, some authors comment that many of the original features have 
persisted throughout the years, as its emphasis on technical cooperation and low-interest 
lending policy. Couto (1999: 46) defends that the IDB is closer to an ideal type of multilateral 
development bank targeting a specific geographic region than any other organization. Largely, 
it’s justified by a unique settlement where most of the resources would come from the United 
States, while the borrowers would hold the majority of the voting power. Besides, some 
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concerns at the time of the Bank was founded were institutionalized as different requirements 
according to the borrower’s capacity or development level, and the connection among 
cooperation, technical assistance and funding. 
 At that time, some factors such as the Keynesian influence about the State role in the 
economy, the legitimacy of the expansion of welfare policies in the United States during 
Roosevelt’s government, and the philosophy of Marshall Plan favored the foundation of a 
development bank. Meanwhile, the rising of development theories and the structuralist-
industrialist approach from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American 
and the Caribbean (ECLA) offered ideas which influenced the region and the role of the 
development banks. In addition, the Cold War order and the fear that Communism could 
present itself as an interesting alternative to the countries in the region created favorable 
political conditions to the foundation of a development bank, since it could not be possible 
without the participation of the United States. 
 The IDB was created in 1959, when the United States finally agreed to participate and 
provide the resources for the Bank. Couto (1999) points out that the Brazilian president 
Juscelino Kubitschek had already insisted with the American government that 
underdevelopment could push Latin America into the communist direction. But the United 
States only took it seriously by the time of the Cuban Revolution in 1958. In other words, the 
immediate cause of the creation of the IDB is related to security considerations and the 
constraints of Cold War. 
 Since the beginning, some features were often discussed by many authors: tolerance 
and a better comprehension of the region’s problems, empathy with Latin American 
development due to the nature of the Bank, more favorable rules for the vulnerable countries 
in the region, the approval of loans or projects according to the financial and technical 
viability and evaluation of merits. According to Couto (1999: 40), “the Bank is its members’ 
server, not their master”. 
 Although these more favorable conditions offered by the Bank to the countries in the 
region are often emphasized in many places, other important issues cannot be underestimated. 
As any other institution (especially an international financial institution), the continuation of 
its existence is conditioned by available resources and the interests coming from some people 
and groups. In order to survive in the banking world, development banks should offer more 
favorable conditions, but they could not risk their own financial balance either.  
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 The emphasis on Latin America’s effective role in the Bank management and 
foundation is a kind of self-propaganda, presented in many of the Bank’s publications, e.g., 
annual reports, project completion reports, booklets, books, internet page, seminars organized 
by the institution, etc. The propaganda and real favorable conditions definitely made it a 
viable option for its members. However, the Latin America’s real influence on the Bank has 
been less than the IDB’s discourse emphasizes. 
 Focusing excessively on the Latin American identity may eclipse the real American 
influence on the Bank. Some episodes illustrate the sometimes underestimated influence of 
the United States: Cuba’s exclusion from the IDB and the suspension of loans to Nicaragua 
during the Sandinista Revolution and to Panama under Noriega’s government in the late 
eighties. They were part of the American foreign policy to leftist movements in Latin America 
and Caribbean. Actually, never has a loan been made if the United States opposed to it 
(TUSSIE, 1995, p. 31). 
 From the beginning of the IDB’s activities in the sixties to the late eighties, there was 
a strong complementarity between the Bank’s original development mandate and the 
consensus around the development strategies that the countries from the region should follow. 
According to Tussie (1995: 21; 79-80), this mandate targeted the funding of investment 
projects and the provision of technical cooperation to the most vulnerable countries in the 
region. Throughout the Bank’s history, there was a pendulum swinging between the 
necessities of balancing, on one side, the funding of viable projects and, on the other, reducing 
poverty or saving the environment. 
 Majorly influenced by ECLA’s ideas, the structuralist and dependentista prognosis, 
widespread in Latin America, was the urgent need for regional industrialization to overcome 
underdevelopment, the dependent condition and the declining terms of trade. However, the 
industrialization in these countries would face many challenges such as the precarious 
infrastructure. This kind of project usually needs high investments and takes a long time to 
return feedback, especially in places where the capital market is barely developed and risk 
averse. At this time, it was a common belief that since there was lack of private actors willing 
to take risks in projects of this nature, the State should do it. For most of Latin American 
countries, the necessary volume of resources for such investments was far beyond their 
capacities. Besides, other types of investment such as sanitation were not commonly financed 
by private banks, such that when IDB started to support these projects, it was nicknamed 
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“water and sanitation bank”. Its first project was the water treatment and sanitation in 
Arequipa in Peru in 1961. According to Tussie (1995: 03; 49), the IDB was responsible for 
two thirds of the investments in drinking water during the sixties and seventies in Latin 
America. Even when the World Bank started to finance this kind of projects in the eighties, 
the IDB didn’t lose the leadership in this market. Likewise the IDB was also known as 
“university bank”, because of its programs in education, and “integration bank”, because of its 
programs of regional integration. 
 In the sixties, the IDB’s funding was based on the submission and examination of 
projects. The productive sector (agriculture, industry and mining) represented 40% of the 
projects, the infrastructure (transportation, communication and energy) 30%, the social 
investment (water and sanitation, housing and education) 25% and the others 5%. In the 
seventies, the Bank stimulated the creation of institutions that could implement the projects 
and provide services associated with them. In the eighties, the Bank had considered the 
possibility of reserving 50% of its resource for low income groups, but the Latin American 
Debt Crisis compelled the IDB to channel part of the available resources to help countries 
with problems in their balances of payment (VÍVARES, 2013, p. 58). 
 Late eighties and early nineties represented a turning point to IDB and its relations 
with its borrowers. In the ideological sphere, the developmentalism paradigm highly 
influenced by ECLA’s structuralist ideas, which had conditioned the creation of the Bank and 
its activities for three decades, was being considered a failed utopia. Meanwhile, some 
countries, e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom, watched the rising of friendly 
governments to neoliberal ideas. Actually, since the Fourth Replenishment in 1976, the 
United States showed little enthusiasm with the Bank, and its stance was eminent in the 
following decade. 
 During one of the most severe crisis for Latin American countries in the 20
th
 century, 
the Debt Crisis, the IDB’s resources were not sufficient to assist all of its borrowers and they 
could not honor their debts with the Bank either. According to Vivares (2013), the United 
States demonstrated that they would not contribute any form of replenishment if major 
changes were not introduced: greater voting power to the Americans and the IDB’s 
submission to the World Bank’s guidelines, which were convergent with the Washington 
Consensus and its neoliberal ideas. In other words, either the IDB supported IMF’s 
prescriptions for structural adjustment or the United States would let the regional 
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development bank become resourceless. Araújo (1991) believes that by this moment the IDB 
was close to the end of its activities, because it was believed that Latin America would not 
agree with the American’s requirements. 
 Rist (2008: 171; 178) notices a discursive shift in the development agencies in that 
time: the concept of “development” built in the Post World War II, associated with the idea of 
national project, center-periphery, world-system, declining terms of trade and import 
substitution industrialization, was losing space to a new vocabulary in which “structural 
adjust” was the central notion, softened by “humanitarian extras” (some resource to fight 
extreme poverty) and new issues, e.g., environmentalism (sustainable development) and 
globalization. It means that this “new development” had to do with economic growth driven 
by global integration and free flow of financial capital and products with compensatory 
measures to relief poverty. Since these agencies needed to survive, but could not justify their 
existence by the old utopia, they had to invent another one. 
 The Seventh Replenishment was approved in March 1989 and the United States 
managed to impose some changes. The first was that the United States, Canada and any third 
country could agree together to postpone the approval of projects or loans. The second one 
was that sectorial (or policy-based) loans
2
 would be co-financed by the IDB and the World 
Bank for two years, renewable for two more years. Actually, it meant that the borrower was 
cornered by exigencies of the two institutions, i.e., even if the country could avoid or block 
the IDB’s conditionalities, it could not do the same with the World Bank’s (ARAÚJO, 1991: 
54). Between the years 1989 and 2002, there were more than seventy co-financed loans to 
Latin America. Argentina and Mexico made the largest number of these kinds of loans; they 
received the greatest volume of resources from co-financed loans. Brazil was the third country 
who received the greatest volume of resources because of a single loan taken during the 
devaluation of the country’s currency in 19993. 
 During the nineties, the neoliberal ideas had strongly influenced the IDB’s programs 
and guidelines. Jonakin (2001) believes that a new form of market fundamentalism took over 
the Bank, since it kept insisting on programs with repeated experiences of failure. The reform 
policies looked to be decided in advance, while the theoretical conviction would come later to 
adjust the necessary justifications.  
                                                 
2
 Sectorial Loans and Policy-Based Loans (abbreviation: PBLs) are synonimous. They had “conditionatilities” – 
imposition-like exigences made by some international financial organizations which sometimes had high 
political and economic cost for the borrower. 
3
 This was also the only loan with conditionality that Brazil made during the period from 1989 to 2002. 
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This context meant some changes in the relation between the IDB and its borrowers, 
but it’s important to mention that some of the features persisted: the IDB continued to be 
Latin America’s most important multilateral source of funding for development projects and 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico continued to be the major borrowers in volume of resources. 
 Among the new features were: 1) Infrastructure and Productive Sector, the most 
important program categories in the previous decades, continued to exist, but some others 
were created or had their importance increased such as Environment and Modernization of 
State. The latter incorporated the principles of this “new development” and became the 
Bank’s major priority in the Eighth Replenishment in 1995, since the IDB and other financial 
institutions believed that part of the Latin American underdevelopment was due to a model of 
State which urged to be reformed and modernized; 2) The Social programs also continued to 
exist, but from this moment on they started to have a compensatory nature associated with 
negative side effects of the Structural Reforms; 3) The convergence between the IDB, the 
World Bank and IMF about the policies that should be adopted by the countries in the 
subcontinent become notorious in that decade
4
;  4) The programs with subnational units as 
States or Provinces and Municipalities increased; 5) The IDB started to defend that 
democratic processes should be deepened in the region, although its own practices were often 
accused by many critics of little deliberation and transparency. 
4. THE IDB’S MODERNIZATION OF STATE PROGRAMS: A COMPARISON 
OF THE BRAZILIAN AND THE ARGENTINIAN CASES 
 Even though the IDB has funded many infrastructure and social programs, the most 
interesting category for this study is the Modernization of State, since its programs are those 
with greater potential to impact state capacity. In this category, the ideal State defended by 
international financial organization – especially the IDB, the World Bank and IMF – can be 
clearly observed. They remarked that Latin American States had an excessively large scope of 
activities, interfered deliberately in the economic realm generating distortions and 
inefficiency, exercised outdated principles of Public Administration, and lacked democracy. 
 The Modernization of State covered a large range of programs which included the 
defense of democratic practices, the decentralization of policy-making processes, the reform 
of Public Administration targeting more efficiency, and even the support to the privatization 
                                                 
4
 Vianna Jr (2000) and Acuña & Tuozzo (2000) identifies submission from the IDB and the World Bank to the 
IMF during this  
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of State companies. Those programs were received with varying degrees of enthusiasm and 
suspicion, reflecting Latin America’s heterogeneity. Some countries, remarkably Argentina, 
signed many of these programs, while others signed only a few. Brazil, for instance, was the 
sixth most important borrower in the Modernization of State programs between 1990 e 2002, 
although it was Latin America’s largest economy. 
 During the period mentioned above, Brazil signed 39 Modernization of State programs 
– representing 14% of all programs signed and 6% of the resources received from the Bank. It 
is important to note that 29 of these programs were technical cooperation, which usually cost 
less and have more limited impact than ordinary loans. Brazil made only one Policy-Based 
Loan. It was not classified as Modernization of State program, but as a Social Sector Loan. 
Among the co-financed programs by the IDB and the World Bank, there was none in the 
category of Modernization of State. 
 
Table 3 – Brazil’s Modernization of State Programs between 1990 and 2002 (technical 
cooperation not included) 
Number of the Project and 
Year of Approval 
Name of the Project 
BR0166/1994 Strengthening of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
BR0193/1995 TC Loan Tax Administration (Brazilian Federal Revenue 
Office) 
BR0171/1996 National Fiscal Administration Program for Brazilian 
States 
BR0175/1997 TC Loan Ipea Network, IBGE, FGV, and Other 
BR0220/1997 the Federal Government Modernization Program 
BR0256/1998 Municipal Development of Porto Alegre 
BR0288/1998 Parliamentary Power Integration 
BR0286/1999 Fiscal Management of Brazilian Municipalities 
BR0327/2001 the Pension System Management Modernization 
BR0365/2002 Modernization Comptroller Office (TCU- Tribunal de 
Contas da União) 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
 Taking into account the theoretical and methodological parameters of state capacity 
defended by Hendrix (2010), the ten ordinary loans of that category were analyzed. Broadly 
speaking, the improvement of the administrative bureaucratic staff and the incentives to the 
officials were not important issues in the Modernization of State programs. Sometimes, 
courses and specific training were included, but generally secondary to the introduction of 
new equipment and technology. There were two exceptions, where these issues were 
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explicitly mentioned: the Pension System Management Modernization (BR-0327) and the 
Federal Government Modernization Program (BR-0220). In the latter, there was only a 
preliminary study about the possibility of reorganizing the civil service, which did not 
actually happen. 
 Five out of ten programs included measures to increase the tax collection capacity: TC 
Loan Tax Administration (BR-0193), National Fiscal Administration Program for Brazilian 
States (BR-0171), Municipal Development of Porto Alegre (BR-0256), Fiscal Management of 
Brazilian Municipalities (BR-0286), and the Modernization of Pension System Management 
(BR-0327). However, it was a priority only in the first three programs mentioned above. The 
IDB’s diagnosis was that the biggest problem in tax collection was bureaucratism, slowness 
and inefficient organization. In order to overcome these problems would be necessary to use 
new equipment and technology (especially computers) and to update the rules, the 
organization, and the management strategies. Since these measures were elaborated from a 
very limited diagnosis, its potential to improve tax collection capacity was also limited and 
only incremental gains could take place. 
 There was an increase in the tax collection and in the tax burden in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, but the absolute majority of experts in the subject do not credit it to the 
improvement of the tax collection capacity or the decrease of tax evasion. They credit the 
increase of existing tax rates and the creation of new taxes, especially the federal consumption 
taxes (taxes on goods and services), which did not have to be shared with States and 
Municipalities and were easier to collect, e.g., COFINS, PIS, CPMF and CIDE-Combustíveis. 
None of the IDB’s programs targeted specifically the improvement of consumption tax 
collection; one of the most important in this subject targeted the income tax. 
 There was an increase of resources collected by the income tax under the 
responsibility of the Receita Federal (Brazilian Federal Revenue Office), which was 
“modernized” by one of the IDB’s program in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government. 
However, none of the consulted authors (SALVADOR, 2006; BRAMI-CELENTANO 
&CARVALHO, 2007; GIAMBIAGI, 2008) credits this increase to the modernization of the 
Receita Federal; they all believe that the non-updating (freezing) of the income tax table 
throughout the years forced many previously exempt individuals to become taxpayers. 
 In the Argentinian case, between 1990 and 2002, there were 43 Modernization of State 
programs – 25 loans and 18 technical cooperation. The programs of this category represented 
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20% of the projects and 55% of the resources received from the IDB during this time. 
Argentina was the country which benefited the most in Modernization of State programs. It 
had the largest number of Modernization of State policy-based loans and general policy-based 
loans. Among the ten co-financed loans by the IDB and the World Bank, six were 
Modernization of State programs. In sum, this category was very important to Argentina, 
which feared no deep commitment with this kind of programs and their ideals. 
 
Table 4 – Argentina’s Modernization of State Programs between 1994 and 2002 (pure 
technical cooperation not included) 
Number of the 
Project and Year of 
Approval 
Name of the Project 
AR0149/1994  Administration Financing Reform Public Sector 
AR0187/1995 Provincial Bank Privatization 
AR0201/1996 Provincial Pension System 
AR0164/1996 Province Support Program for Buenos Aires 
AR0144/1997 Support for Enterprise Restructuring 
AR0220/1997 Institutionalized Support AFIP 
AR0218/1998 Fiscal Reform Support for Grand City of Buenos Aires 
AR0254/1998 Special Structural Adjustment Program and Strengthening of 
Banking System Safeguards 
AR0260/1998 Repo: Security Banking S. From AR0254 
AR0256/1999 Strengthening Foreign Trade Policy 
AR0265/2000 Institutional Strengthening of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
International Trade and Worship 
AR0257/2000 State Modernization of Cordoba Province 
AR0271/2000 Fiscal Balance & Social Management Program 
AR0266/2001 Financial Sector Program 
AR0283/2001 PEF:AR0266 Financial Sector Program 
AR0284/2001 Support Financial Services Sector 
AR0280/2001 Fiscal Support Sectoral Program 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
 From the analyzed programs
5
, three of them considered the improvement of the 
quality of the bureaucratic administrative staff through training and courses, organizational 
restructuring or career and salary plans: Institutionalized Support AFIP
6
 (AR0220), Fiscal 
Reform Support for Grand City of Buenos Aires (AR0218), and State Modernization of 
                                                 
5
 It was not possible to analyze the 25 Modernization of State Programs, since many of the Loan Proposals and 
Project Completion Reports were not available online in the IDB’s website in the time of this research was 
taking place. Only documents post-1994 were available. 
6
 AFIP or Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos is one of the country’s most important tax collection 
institutions. 
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Cordoba Province (AR0257). In the AR0220 and AR0218, the results of the programs were 
not considered by the Bank’s completion reports as completely satisfactory. In other words, 
the quality of the bureaucratic administrative staff was not a priority in the Modernization of 
States programs for Argentina and when they were considered, the results were not 
surprisingly positive. 
 Six programs included the increasing of tax collection capacity: Provincial Pension 
System AR0201, Province Support Program for Buenos Aires AR0164, Institutionalized 
Support AFIP AR0220, Reform Support for Grand City of Buenos Aires AR0218, State 
Modernization of Cordoba Province AR0257, and Fiscal Support Sectoral Program AR0280. 
In most cases, reports considered that the results were satisfactory, although the Argentinian 
Crisis and the end of the Convertibility Plan had complicated an accurate evaluation. As those 
programs were elaborated on the basis of the same limited principles applied to the Brazilian 
case, the results were not very different from incremental ones in most of them. But there 
were two important exceptions: the AFIP and Pension System programs. 
 The AFIP program targeted broader and deeper reforms, not only the traditional 
modernization of equipment (informatization) and the introduction of new management 
techniques. It included, for instance, the revision of rules and suggestions of changes in the 
legislation, simplification of bureaucratic procedures, expansion of control, and organizational 
restructuring of this agency. Although a simple and automatic association between the IDB’s 
program and the enhancement of the AFIP is not possible, there was a notorious increase of 
the tax collected while the program was taking place. Between 1997 and 2004, AFIP doubled 
the volume of resources collected.
7
 
 On the other hand, the Pension System Program, trying to substitute the old model of 
pension by a new one where the private sector would have a more important role, had 
counter-productive effects, generating a huge and chronic deficit. Vivares (2013) believes that 
this problem in the pension system was an important factor to understand the breakdown of 
the Argentinian Convertibility (1 peso exchangeable for 1 dollar). 
 The IDB’s Modernization of State programs were much more important to Argentina 
than to Brazil; this is evident in the comparison of the number of projects, volume of 
resources in this category, co-financed programs, and policy-based loans. These differences 
probably are related to the distinct paths of Brazil’s and Argentina’s political economies and, 
                                                 
7
 According to the Project Completion Report of the AR0220.  
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consequently, to their distinct levels of enthusiasm with the neoliberal principles that 
conditioned these programs. The developmentalism ideals which guided policy-makers in 
Brazil for almost six uninterrupted decades (1930-1989) could not simply disappear 
overnight. The generations socialized under this paradigm would have a tendency to show 
resistance to the neoliberal ideas. On the other hand, Argentina had a shorter and less intense 
developmentalist experience. 
 
Table 5 - The Modernization of State Programs in Brazil and Argentina (1990-2002) 
 Brazil Argentina 
Modernization of 
State Programs 
(number of 
approved projects) 
Total 39 
(29 were technical 
cooperation) 
43 
(18 were technical 
cooperation) 
Proportional to all 
approved projects 
14% 20% 
Modernization of 
State Programs 
(volume of 
resources) 
Proportional to all 
approved projects 
6% 55% 
IDB’s Policy-Based Loans of the 
Modernization of State 
0 9 
Co-financed Loans of Modernization of 
State 
0 6 
Source: Elaborated by the author 
 
 In the regard of the improvement of the bureaucratic administrative staff, the effects in 
both countries were not expected to initiate a revolution, since it was not a real priority, 
according to the main goals set in the proposals of the Modernization of State programs. 
Similarly, the objectives about the improvement of tax collection capacity were not ambitious, 
based mostly in the technological modernization (new computers and softwares) and the 
introduction of new administrative procedures. They did not really target one of the most 
important limiting factors in tax collection in Latin America: tax evasion in its multiple 
dimensions.
8
 According to the IDB Project Completion Reports, most of the results were 
discreet. The two exceptions, which happened to Argentina, point to opposite directions: one 
to the increase of tax collection and the other to the decrease of it. Argentina’s deeper 
                                                 
8
 The mainstream studies about tax evasion are based on rational-choice models, in which individuals analyze 
costs and benefits of their actions. If the probability of punishment is low, the incentive to evade is high, as in 
countries where institutions are weak. Allington and Sandmo (1972) are some of the pioneers in this perspective. 
Others researchers focus on the low legimity of the government (Linhares, 2011) or the lack of a civic-
republican culture (Bresser-Pereira, 1997). 
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commitment with the Bank’s ideals and programs solely resulted in neither only the 
improvement nor only the deterioration of the tax collect capacity; sometimes they had only 
incremental gains as it happened to less committed countries, but in other cases there was 
intensification, making good results better and bad ones worse. 
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 The comparison between the Brazilian case, less convergent with the Bank’s new 
notion of development, and the Argentinian case, ideologically closer to the IDB’s programs, 
does not allow us to conclude that there is an automatic positive or negative relation between 
the Modernization of State programs and the enhancement of state capacity during the studied 
period. However, it suggests an ambiguous potential to magnify both good and bad results. 
 All development banks present “development” as their major goal, but the promotion 
of the features required for the increase of state capacity was not in the Bank’s agenda during 
the Neoliberal period. This absence may have happened because countries with greater state 
capacity (what requires qualified and loyal civil servants to national interests) value their 
autonomy, explore their freedom of action and prefer to be “on the driver’s seat”. If all the 
countries were endowed with great state capacity, they could take care of their projects and 
development strategies autonomously, doing without these development bank’s programs. 
The ultimate consequences of this scenario would be an intense pressure for these banks to 
reinvent themselves completely or to cease existing. In the neoliberal resignification of 
development, there was no room for the notions such as autonomy and national interests. 
Perhaps, that is why that period was unfavorable to anything associated with state capacity. 
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